Tuesday, July 13, 2010

An Epistemological Problem with Anarchism

Libertarians have always been known as opponents of government intervention. However, the popularity of the idea that government is an aggressive institution per se and that it should be abolished and replaced with, among other alternatives, private courts and law enforcement agencies, has been growing among libertarians. The following will demonstrate that government is not an aggressive institution per se, that its existence is a necessary condition for the long-term maintenance of civil society, and that, by extension, its absence, also known as anarchism, is neither sustainable in the long-term nor desirable.

Lets begin by clarifying some terms. A government is an institution, equipped with factors of production, that monopolizes the use of force over a given geographic area. By "monopolize" it is meant to control something (in this case, the use of force) to the exclusion of all others. "Monopoly" will be further used to mean "exclusive control." The geographic area within which a government monopolizes the use of force is called its jurisdiction. Force (also known as coercion) refers to any act that, borrowing from Gennady Stolyarov, disrupts the physical integrity of a person's body, property, or obstructs a person's ownership of his or her property. A punch that leaves the recipient with a black eye is an example of a forceful act.

There are two kinds of forceful or coercive acts: initiatory and non-initiatory (or retaliatory) acts. An act of initiatory force is any act that involves starting the use of force against another; it means using force against one who has not himself started the use of force against another. If Smith is minding his business and has not initiated the use of force against another within society, and Jones approaches Smith and punches him in the face, then Jone's act of force is initiatory. An act of retaliatory force is any act that involves using force in response to and against an aggressor, someone who has committed an act of aggression, i.e., either an act of initiatory force or an act whereby the actor threatens to initiate the use of force. Within the category of retaliatory force we have emergency force, a type of retaliatory force which involves the use of force against another (i.e., an aggressor) who has either initiated the use of force or has threatened to initiate the use of force, where recourse to the government (in particular, the police) is impossible if the government exists (we will see what this means shortly).

A society is merely a group of people who live in close proximity. A civil society is a group of people, living in close proximity, who generally refrain from initiating the use of force or threatening to initiate the use of force against each other, i.e., aggression. A civil society is a society governed by the non-aggression principle, a normative proposition which asserts that "All acts that involve initiating the use of force or threatening to initiate the use of force are immoral and should be prohibited." The importance of an emphasis on force rests upon the fact that only by force may one violate the moral rights of another. A moral right is an legal sanction to commit a specific act in the absence of interruption that one should possess (as opposed to a legal right which is a legal sanction to commit a specific act in the absence of interruption that one does possess). Each and every non-aggressing human being possesses moral rights, the three most broad moral rights being those to life, liberty, and private property. According to Craig Biddle,
The right to life is the right to act as one’s life requires—which means, on the judgment of one’s mind. The right to liberty is the right to be free from coercive interference—so that one can act on the judgment of one’s mind. The right to property is the right to keep, use, and dispose of the product of one’s effort—which one does by acting on one’s judgment.
A Hypothetical Scenario

The epistemological problem of anarchism referred to in the title may be best understood through a hypothetical scenario. Let's say that Jones is resting on a bench in Central Park (assume Central Park is privately owned, so a special "anonymous" someone won't wet him/her/itself - you know who you are), adjacent to Smith with whom he shares the bench. Now lets say that Adam approaches the bench in a van, exits the van, apprehends Jones (coercively of course), announces to Jones that he is under arrest for having committed an act of theft against him, informs Jones of his legal rights, throws him in the van, and drives away. Let's assume that none of the three men has met another before, nor has any man heard news of another before. Consider the epistemic condition of Smith, an individual among others, after this event transpires. He, along with a few other people, has just witnessed an arrest of one man by another man. Can he determine if Adam's act of force against Jones is initiatory or retaliatory? Smith is confronted with a profound disjunctive proposition: Either Adam's act of force is initiatory or retaliatory. Is he capable, in this epistemic state, to determine which of the disjuncts is true?

Of course, the answer is undoubtedly no. Why? As stated earlier, an act of force is initiatory if its use is started by one agent against another. An act of force is retaliatory if its employed against another who has either initiated the use of force or threatened to initiate the use of force. Thus, in order to determine if Adam's act of force against Jones is either initiatory or retaliatory, Smith would have to know if Jones aggressed against someone or not. If Jones aggressed against someone, then Adam's act of force is retaliatory; if Jones did not aggress against someone, then Adam's act of force is initiatory.

We must ponder a further question before we answer the first. Does Smith know if Jones has aggressed against another previously or not? No, because it is assumed that each man has been unaware of the existence of the other until the coercive incident. Thus, Smith cannot possibly know if Adam's act of force is initiatory or retaliatory because he cannot meet the necessary conditions for the possession of such knowledge. This is the epistemological problem before Smith.

Smith neither knows if "Adam's act of force is initiatory" or "Adam's act of force is retaliatory" is true. Adam may be a righteous retaliator or a kidnapper. This fact demonstrates that if its not proven that an act of force is going to be retaliatory before its committed, then such an act, when it occurs, is indistinguishable from an act of initiatory force. In this case, Adam's status (either he is an aggressor or a retaliator) is not self-evident to Smith.

A logical conclusion from the above event is that Adam is a threat (a potential violator of moral rights) and as such is a hazard not only to Smith but to his local community. Consider the following argument. Adam is an individual who uses non-emergency force without first demonstrating to the local community that his act of force will be retaliatory. An individual who uses non-emergency force without first demonstrating to the local community that his act of force will be retaliatory is a potential violator of moral rights; therefore, Adam is a potential violator of moral rights. Furthermore, a potential violator of moral rights is a hazard to the local community; therefore, Adam is a hazard to the local community.

Limited Government as the Solution

Naturally, the question "how can a local community deal with Adam as a hazard?" arises. Since any individual who uses force as Adam does is a threat, the pressing question is "how can a local community deal with private threats, with the hazard of private, non-emergency force, i.e., force employed by individuals without governmental approval and without prior public knowledge of its nature and, therefore, indistinguishable to society's members from aggression?" Private force is force employed by any person or persons without expressed governmental approval (we'll see what a government is later). We see that it is not enough that Adam prove to himself that his act of force is going to be retaliatory. What makes him a threat is the fact that he fails to prove to those within his local community that his act of force is going to be retaliatory. If the members of civil society consider it to be a value, then ipso facto they will do what is necessary to protect it against both violators and potential violators of moral rights like Adam. If the consequent is false, then so is the antecedent.

The solution then to the hazard of private force is to ban it, with the exception of its emergency form; the members of civil society must organize to prohibit private, non-emergency force. As an important side note, if Rick is attacked by Chris, then Rick possesses the moral right to employ emergency force against him without proving to the pubic that his use of force is going to be retaliatory because Rick's attack puts Chris in a situation where such an obligation cannot possibly be fulfilled without harmful consequences, i.e., without having to focus on something other than self-defense (he would however, in a civil society, be forced to prove to others after the incident that his use of force was emergency-based, not initiatory). In such a situation, recourse to assistance may be impossible. But by organizing to ban the use of private, non-emergency force, the members of civil society retaliate against the hazard of private, non-emergency force. Acting against the hazard of private, non-emergency force, in this case, is a retaliatory act, not an initiatory one. The hazard of private, non-emergency force arises from the nature of society, and by organizing to ban its use the members of civil society act in response to it.

Yet while private, non-emergency force should be banned, it should also be noted that force is still an instrument that needs to be used, even in civil society. History lucidly demonstrates that the existence of civil society does not preclude the existence of aggressors; there always have been willing users of aggression and there will continue to be such people in the foreseeable future. The only efficacious method of protecting one's moral rights from aggression is through retaliation - force. Murderers, rapists, and thieves - users of aggression - can only be stopped with countervailing force. Thus, the next question that must be answered by advocates of civil society is "how can the individuals of a local community:

1.) effectively ban private, non-emergency force and simultaneously
2.) employ retaliatory force in a way that effectively protects the moral rights of individuals within that local community?"

The answer is by permitting some within civil society to use force, including the force that's required to effectively maintain a ban on the use of private, non-emergency force, within a well-defined geographical area on the condition that they will sufficiently demonstrate, publicly and before they use force, that their coercive acts will be retaliatory ones. Those individuals who are allowed to use force under such conditions are collectively referred to as government. All or most of a particularly small community could preside over the granting of a conditional permission to a capable individual or individuals to use force against an aggressor or to use force to maintain a ban on the use of private, non-emergency force. However, as a community increases in population size, in population density, and spreads out over a broader area, the presence of most, let alone all community members becomes impossible. In order to cope with this problem, the community must refer the presiding to representatives, again on the condition that they will ensure that anyone who wishes to use force must prove publicly that their act of force will be retaliatory. In this situation, government becomes not only those who are permitted to use force but those who preside over the granting of conditional permissions on behalf of the citizens who cannot preside over them. As populations grow, the referring as described above will be performed by more and more individuals, making government larger and therefore more capable of mitigating the problems of population growth. Eventually, population growth may even warrant a division of a jurisdiction.

But nevertheless, a rights-respecting government protects the moral rights of its citizens by retaliating against those who initiate the use of force or threaten to initiate the use of force. Those who use private, non-emergency force or threaten to use such force ipso facto are threatening to initiate the use of force, therefore, the government contributes to the protection of moral rights when it retaliates against those who employ or threaten to employ such force. In order to simultaneously ban private, non-emergency force and employ force on behalf of its local community, a government must monopolize the use of retaliatory force. And in all cases, a rights-respecting government is transparent and accountable to the people within its jurisdiction; cedant arma togae was once said.

Now, even with a government in place, Smith could not know with certainty that, say, if the police arrest Jones from the park bench that the police are employing retaliation rather than aggression. A government, or government employees, are quite obviously capable of employing aggression. However, with a proper, limited government in place, there is significant evidence to suggest that police activity is retaliatory activity, particularly when those who enlist within the police department demonstrate via training and oaths that they are committed to the proper use of force. If police departments continue to employ force in a proper, retaliatory style over time, then the reputation of said departments and the inductive inference that police activity is probably retaliatory activity are both reinforced.

The Libertarian Anarchist Argument from the Non-aggression Principle Against Government

Many libertarian anarchists, especially those who agree with the above description of moral rights, aggression, and retaliation argue that government is antithetical to civil society. Their arguments range from appeals to economics, to history, and to morality. The following is a formalized version of perhaps their most popular argument, the argument from the non-aggression principle, famously offered by former libertarian anarchist Roy A. Childs against Objectivist Ayn Rand. Again, the non-aggression principle is an ethical or "ought" proposition which asserts the following: All acts that involve initiating the use of force or threatening to initiate the use of force are immoral and should be prohibited. The libertarian anarchist argument from the non-aggression principle proceeds as follows:

-Legend:
P = premise, C = conclusion, number (ex. P1m) indicates the order in which the proposition appears, m = minor premise, M = major premise

P1m -All institutions that monopolize the use of force within a geographical area are institutions that prohibit other individuals and institutions from employing force within that same area (of course, with the exception of emergency force in this case)
P2M -All institutions that prohibit other individuals and institutions from employing force within the same area are institutions that initiate the use of force
C1 -All institutions that monopolize the use of force within a geographical area are institutions that initiate the use of force

P3m -A government is an institution that monopolizes the use of force within a geographical area
C1P4M -All institutions that monopolize the use of force within a geographical area are institutions that initiate the use of force
C2 -A government is an institution that initiates the use of force

C2P5m -A government is an institution that initiates the use of force
P6M -All institutions that initiate the use of force are things that are antithetical to a civil society
C3 -A government is something that is antithetical to a civil society

The following propositions are false:
-P2M, C1P4M, C2P5m, C3
The following propositions are true
-P1m, P3m, P6M

The forms of the sub-arguments within the broader libertarian anarchist argument are all valid. Unfortunately, for the libertarian anarchist, each sub-argument contains a false premise, which ultimately dooms the conclusion of each to falsity. A valid form (such that its impossible for the conclusion to be false while the premises are true) and true premises are necessary conditions for the existence of a sound argument. In order for the libertarian anarchist argument to properly represent reality, it must be sound, not merely valid.

A Critique of the Primary False Proposition within the Anarchist Argument

1.) P2M -All institutions that prohibit other individuals and institutions from employing force within the same area are institutions that initiate the use of force.

This is false. Its often objected by many libertarian anarchists that, within a geographic area in which the use of force is monopolized by the government, the government, as part of its monopoly of the use of force, prohibits individuals or institutions from competing with it with regard to the use of force to protect moral rights. This is true - if the government monopolizes the use of force within a geographical area, then it prohibits all others from competing with it with regard to the use of force to protect moral rights. However, these same libertarian anarchists go on to argue that if the government prohibits all others from competing with it with regard to the use of force to protect moral rights, then the government initiates the use of force, thereby making it inherently antithetical to the non-aggression principle and, therefore, anathema to civil society.

The reason why it is not true that if the government prohibits all others from competing with it with regard to the use of force to protect moral rights, then the government initiates the use of force - the reason why "All institutions that prohibit other individuals and institutions from employing force within that same area are institutions that initiate the use of force" is false is because by prohibiting competition with regard to use of force in the protection of moral rights, the government (a limited one with the purpose of protecting moral rights) retaliates against the hazard of private, non-emergency force.

How does society, how does a local community know if, under libertarian anarchism, a competing protection agency actually uses retaliatory force when it uses force? Under a rights-respecting social system where the government monopolizes the use of force, its monopoly is conditional - its granted to it by society's members on the condition that it use its monopoly only to use retaliatory force and only to protect moral rights. After the individuals of the government demonstrate to the local community that they are both capable of and willing to use force only retaliatorily and only in the protection of moral rights, then its reasonable to assume that future coercive acts committed by the government will be retaliatory, rights-protecting ones. Each member of government can display such a capability and willingness through a number actions such as (as members of the police and the military do today) taking oaths, agreeing to certain terms of employment via legal documents, undergoing appropriate training, etc. A vigilant citizenry of course will, without intermission, scrutinize their government in order to ensure that it continues to use force only in a retaliatory way and only to protect moral rights; there's nothing inconceivable about a corrupt and inefficient government being overhauled by disillusioned, liberty-loving citizens.

However, how can a local community obtain such an assurance under libertarian anarchism? Its conceivable that under libertarian anarchism, a private protection agency could voluntarily prove to society's members that it intended to use force only in a retaliatory way and only to protect moral rights. However, the problem is that under libertarian anarchism, the condition that one demonstrate, before using force, that one's use of force will be retaliatory and employed in the protection of moral rights, does not exist as a law, i.e., as an enforced rule of social conduct. Solving the dual social problem of simultaneously protecting moral rights against the hazard of private, non-emergency force and enabling the use of retaliatory force to protect moral rights in general requires a solution that is illegal under libertarian anarchism. In order to protect themselves from the hazard of private, non-emergency force, a local community must ban the use of private, non-emergency force. Meanwhile, citizens must use force to protect themselves against aggressors like murders and thieves. The only effective way to perform both is to, as argued above, vest some within a local community with the conditional monopoly of force as articulated above. Unfortunately, the granting of such conditional monopoly is criminal under libertarian anarchism, for under libertarian anarchism it is illegal to prohibit competition with regard to the use of force to protect moral rights. Consider the following argument:

-The granting of conditional monopoly of the use of force is something that involves banning the use of private, non-emergency force and, therefore, banning competition with regard to the use of force to protect rights
-Something that involves banning the use of private, non-emergency force and, therefore, banning competition with regard to the use of force to protect rights is something that is illegal under libertarian anarchism
-The granting of conditional monopoly of the use of force is something that is illegal under libertarian anarchism

Since proposition P2M is false and the entire libertarian anarchist argument is valid, the libertarian anarchist argument is unsound.

In summary, the epistemological problem with libertarian anarchism is that it allows private, non-emergency force, i.e., force employed without a prior demonstration that it will be retaliatory and employed in the protection of moral rights. Such force is, by definition, not proven to be retaliatory, ergo it must be inferred by society's members, whom such force thereby threatens, that such force is aggressive. Society overcomes this problem by creating an institution called government which allows the people to retaliate against the hazard of private, non-emergency force as well as employ force to protect moral rights in general.


-
Biddle, Craig. "“Immigration and Individual Rights” by Craig Biddle." The Objective Standard: A Journal of Culture and Politics. 2008. Web. 14 July 2010. http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2008-spring/immigration-individual-rights.asp.
-Watkins, Don. "Epistemological Anarchy." Diana Hsieh: NoodleFood. 22 Dec. 2005. Web. 14 July 2010. http://blog.dianahsieh.com/2005/12/epistemological-anarchy.html.

Picture via Daniel Zanini H.

27 comments:

  1. Interesting, so if I see someone wearing a government uniform then I know their use of force is retaliatory, whereas without a government monopoly on force I would have to use my best judgement based on limited information. That makes things simple, for instance:

    I used to think the holocaust was an act of aggression, but now that I've noticed that it was prosecuted by people in government uniforms I can see that it was simply an act of retaliatory force.

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  2. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (who watches the watchers ?).
    This brings us back to the question of what to do when a government - with a monopoly on force - fails in its duty. The people within a society must be able to employ force over government. It would interesting to explore alternatives other than granting monopoly use of force to any one entity. Ie. A local government with the right to limited use of force (police/sherif), a federal government without the power to use force within its own borders (unarmed FBI), and a local militia with the right to use force on their private property. In a free society, no one entity can have a monopoly on the use of force.

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  3. In a similar vein I would like to point out another epistemological problem with anarchism. This one concerning hamburgers.

    Lets say Jones and Smith are sitting on a park bench as before. Now Jones gets hungry and walks over to Adam (working at McDonalds) to buy a hamburger. None of these people knew each other before today.

    How does Jones know the hamburger is safe to eat if Adam doesn't work for the government? How does Smith know that he's not witnessing an act of aggression as Adam may be poisoning Jones? We need a government monopoly on hamburgers, it's the only way three people previously unknown to each other can safely interact in civil society.

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  4. Michael,

    I appreciate the obvious time and effort you put into this but I believe you still come up short.

    Your arguing on an ends-means basis-- that anarchism is ipso facto "wrong" because of sticky situations that might occur. Oddly enough, the first thing I thought of when I heard your park bench kidnapping story was "How would bystanders know if the kidnappers were retaliatory if they wore government uniforms?" As we've seen in the US amongst police and abroad by US military and "intelligence" personnel, people are routinely kidnapped in the name of "retaliation" when the acts are actually blatantly initiatory in nature. This is an intellectual problem of the enforcement of justice whatever the system, not just in a fully-privatized world.

    Another problem with your analysis is you create in your own mind a special category called "government", to which people who belong get special privileges that would not be just otherwise. How do they get these special powers? There is no process other than them becoming part of the government. You say the people grant this authority to the institution-- how do they grant a power they do not have themselves, individually?

    Finally, government is, by definition a non-rights respecting institution. To the extent the government finances itself coercively (taxation) and operates with a non-unanimous mandate, it is a coercive institution. The moment it operates and finances itself on a voluntary basis, it has ceased to be a government and is instead a voluntary community organization. You can not propose "an institution which violates rights" as the solution to the problem "how do we settle disputes where a person's rights have or potentially may be violated?" without contradicting yourself, which you have.

    I wish you luck as you try to wrap your head around these concepts and I'd be happy to keep discussing them. It's obviously not a problem of intelligence or logical capability-- you've got both in spades. I think you're just missing a few simple elements here, passing up the obvious in the search for the remote and complex.

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  5. Anonymous #1 - You're an ass for not possessing the will to respond without pure sarcasm, but I will respond anyway since I anticipated your lousy objection.

    You write,

    "Interesting, so if I see someone wearing a government uniform then I know their use of force is retaliatory, whereas without a government monopoly on force I would have to use my best judgment based on limited information."

    This is an unsound inference, regardless of whether its sarcastic or not. It cannot be inferred whatsoever from my broader argument. I do not argue that a government uniform per se is a sign that force is being employed in a retaliatory way and therefore responsibly. Instead, I argue that the virtue of a limited government as prescribed above is that it provides such an assurance before it acts. A proper limited government reassures those its charged with protecting that its use of force will be retaliatory and aimed at protecting moral rights. Under libertarian anarchism, there is no such assurance because the use of force condition that constrains a limited government does not exist under libertarian anarchism.

    "I used to think the holocaust was an act of aggression, but now that I've noticed that it was prosecuted by people in government uniforms I can see that it was simply an act of retaliatory force."

    You.are.a.fucking.moron.

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  6. Taylor writes,

    "As we've seen in the US amongst police and abroad by US military and "intelligence" personnel, people are routinely kidnapped in the name of "retaliation" when the acts are actually blatantly initiatory in nature. This is an intellectual problem of the enforcement of justice whatever the system, not just in a fully-privatized world."

    I don't deny the possibility of mistakes, but I also don't reject limited government because of such a possibility. The problem I see with libertarian anarchism is that it is a social system that conducts itself as if each individual possesses the right to use force with out demonstrating to the public beforehand that its use of force will be retaliatory and aimed at protecting moral rights. Such a "right" amounts to a right to aggress, a right to threaten to initiate the use of force. Now *that* is a violation of the non-aggression principle.

    "Another problem with your analysis is you create in your own mind a special category called "government", to which people who belong get special privileges that would not be just otherwise. How do they get these special powers? There is no process other than them becoming part of the government. You say the people grant this authority to the institution-- how do they grant a power they do not have themselves, individually?"

    The granting of a conditional monopoly is, I believe, a non-complex process. Society's members identify those who are capable and willing to use force to protect moral rights and relay to them the following: We will refrain from using force in a non-emergency way and allow you (the government) to use force without interference from us as long as you use force in a retaliatory way and to protect moral rights. As soon as you begin to use force in a non-retaliatory way, we will use force ourselves to reform the way you conduct yourself. If using force in a non-retaliatory way becomes a chronic habit with you, then we will use force to overthrow and replace you.

    "Finally, government is, by definition a non-rights respecting institution. To the extent the government finances itself coercively (taxation) and operates with a non-unanimous mandate, it is a coercive institution. The moment it operates and finances itself on a voluntary basis, it has ceased to be a government and is instead a voluntary community organization."

    I gather you know I reject taxation. And I specifically tackled the Roy Childs argument. Don Watkins critiques Child's argument as well in the bibliography.

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  7. I'll respond after work. My last comment was deleted by "large url request" problems.

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  8. The author's argument begins with the understanding that men are not omniscient. He has worked himself to the conclusion that since men are not omniscient a special monopolistic institution of government must be created. This, supposedly, will allow men to be morally certain in matters pertaining to the use of force. The approach is an example of crude rationalistaion and evasion of fact of reality. It is illogical. Still, let's examine the author's scenario from a (slightly) wider persepective.

    Smith's problem is said to be that he can't be certain that Adam is exercising retaliatory force in a non-emergency situation. He remains uncertain whether Adam is a criminal or not. The "solution" offered to Smith is that a government be instituted and its members can act to detain Jones.

    Let's see what happens now. Let's say that another man, Adolf, approaches the bench in a van, exits the van, apprehends Jones (coercively of course), announces to Jones that he is under arrest for having committed an act of theft against Adam, informs Jones of his legal rights, throws him in the van, and drives away.

    Smith is supposed to take comfort in the "solution" that if Adolf is a member of the government, then Smith can rest assured that all is well. The unstated assumption is that should Adolf be a member of the government his use of force would necessaily be retaliatory. That is, Smith is expected to accept that Adolf is behaving morally solely because he is a member of government.

    There are problems.

    For a start there is the irrational expectation that a member of government is necessarily going to behave morally.

    Yeah.

    Right.

    Guaranteed he will.

    So Smith's problem has been expanded in scope. His original problem remains unaltered. He still has to determine whether Adolf is behaving morally. Now he has the additional problem of identifing Adolf as a member of government.

    continues >----

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  9. Let's accept that none of these men knows the others and they have never met previously and that they possess no prior knowledge of each other. That results in the need for Adolf to somehow identify himself as a member of the government. The obvious means is for Adolf to display the symbols of government authority on his person- a uniform, badges, special hat, utility belt, a shield etc. Perhaps he has a document or an identity card to proclaim his status...

    Of course, that could all be fraudulent material which naughty Adolf prepared for the commission of a crime. That still leaves Smith with exactly the same epistemological problem as before. Is Adolf initiating force or is he retaliating? Thus, the calling into being of a government has made no difference to Smith's epistemological position.

    Oh dear.

    Now, what has been evaded thus far is examination of the nature of government itself, the nature of the people who are attracted to it, the historical record of how real government behaves, the difficulty/impossiblity of restricting government to "enumerated powers" and so on. Well worth reviewing the literature on that.

    Moving on. Let's accept that at a particular time a specific government in a certain situation instructed its members to behave morally. Can Smith be certain that they would do so? Would the government members restrict themselves to the expression of retaliatory force only?

    Yeah.

    Right.

    Guaranteed they would.

    Poor Smith's problem expands yet further. He must be certain Adolf is a member of the government. He must determine whether Adolf is behaving morally in the exercise of his government granted authorities, priviledges and powers and then he must determine whether the government is itself behaving morally towards Jones and towards Adolf as well.

    See, it is possible that Adolf is merely a hired hand, a dupe, who is following orders. Adolf may well honestly believe that Jones is a criminal since that is what he has been told by his superior. Adolf may well be honestly holding his view and expressing what he believes to be retaliatory force, even when it is, in fact, an initiation of force against an innocent. In such a case Adolf has an eiptemological problem every bit as vexatious as Smith's...

    The lack of certainty of Smith serves merely to illustrate that Smith is not omniscient. It does not follow that establishment of a government institution would relieve Smith or any other individual of this characteristic. Further, it does not follow that the entity of government would, once established, solve the epistemological problem Smith faces. Further yet, it does not follow that the entity of government, once established, would be moral or even is moral (can it be?). Finally, it does not follow that the entity of government, once established, would consist of members who would necessarily behave in a moral way when exercising the monopoly powers and priviledges and special status they would have at their command.

    The author's argument fails to refute the libertarian anarchist position.

    Sione

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  10. This is anonymous #1,

    Your article was painfully long and stupid. I noticed you're only 22 so it figures.

    Read more, write less.

    You're such a jackass that you set your example of how a libertarian society would fail in a public park. Who owns the park? There is no public property in a libertarian society. Your "epistemological problem" would disappear right there if you specified who owned the park and under what contractual arrangement your three mutual strangers happened to find themselves on the premises.

    Try your argument again and this time do it on private property. Let me help you:
    Smith and Jones are sitting next to each at a blackjack table at the Bellagio. Adam, dressed in a casino security uniform, drags Jones away from the table. Is Smith faced with an epistemological problem here?

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  11. Michael,

    Aside from the rudeness and belligerent tone (and the insinuation that, simply because you're 22, you have little to offer intellectually), I have to agree with the various anonymous commenters here, as well as "Sione."

    I think the latest Anon brought up yet another, and perhaps the strongest counter-point, something I noticed myself ("Central Park?!") but consequently neglected to follow-through on in my comment.

    So, I see a number of failures here, ranging from, "Totally flawed premise-- this problem is absent when property rights are properly defined and all property is private" to "Your critiques apply just as much to the position you're defending as the one you're attacking, if you were able to step back and look objectively at the two."

    Of course, my favorite is always "It's wrong to initiate the use of force." If your government does this, it's wrong, period, end of story. If it doesn't, I am not sure how it's a government. Maybe you could explain that better.

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  12. Let me respond first to Anon #1 aka "fucking moron." Abracadabra. Central Park is now privately owned in a libertarian anarchist society. The problem still stands. Say Adam is the owner of Northern Park and Jones is the owner of Central Park. Let's say Adam alleges that Jones committed an act of theft against him and Jones denies the allegation. Thus, allow our story to begin. Adam then (asserting his "right" to use force without demonstrating to society's members that his use of force will be retaliatory and aimed at protecting moral rights) makes a coercive incursion into Central Park to apprehend Jones. What should Smith and his fellow park patrons make of the situation? Was Adam's act of force initiatory or retaliatory? Hence the epistemological problem of libertarian anarchism.

    I anticipate an objection along the lines of "Well, what is to stop Adam and Jones from forming some ex ante contractual agreement to settle potential disputes?" Contractual agreements are fine (and would probably enable disputants to avoid conflict in many cases in a free society) but what if Adam and Jones disagree in a particular case where their prior contractual agreements fail to settle their dispute? Their prior contractual agreements can only solve so many problems. It certainly is not inconceivable that prior contractual agreements may fail.

    And what would the content of these prior contractual agreements be to begin with? Surely, if both Adam and Jones are assertive business owners, neither of them will agree to legal conditions that will put them at an unnecessary disadvantage.

    Still, the possibility of disagreements creates the need for an institution to assure society's members that force employed is retaliatory and aimed at protecting moral rights. Only a dunce such as yourself (who precipitated the nastiness to begin with) would misconstrue such a superficial detail as a profound error and allow it to prevent you from understanding the logic of my broader argument.

    As a side note, the Bellagio is an owned subsidiary of MGM Resorts International which is a member of the American Gaming Association and, therefore, is bound by a whole repertoire of government mandates regarding security (http://www.americangaming.org/federal_issues/legislative_regulatory_issues.cfm). So if Adam is a security guard at the Bellagio, Smith can relax.

    Be careful. This is now the second time you've almost committed argumentative suicide.

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  13. Anonymous #1 here again,

    Michael, aka "Noob", Murray Rothbard among others has dealt with the points you raised. It is tedious and boring to refute your arguments when they've already been handled in detail.

    Regarding your new scenario of the now privately owned central park you should read "Ethics of Liberty", specifically chapters 12 "self defense" and 13 "punishment and proportionality".

    Regarding your fallacy:
    "the possibility of disagreements creates the need for an institution to assure society's members that force employed is retaliatory"
    I will directly copy Rothbard's argument from "Power and Market":
    The laissez-faireist also assumes that there must be a single compulsory monopoly of coercion and decision-making in society, that there must, for example, be one Supreme Court to hand down final and unquestioned decisions. But he fails to recognize that the world has lived quite well throughout its existence without a single, ultimate decision-maker over its whole inhabited surface. The Argentinian, for example, lives in a state of “anarchy,” of nongovernment, in relation to the citizen of Uruguay—or of Ceylon. And yet the private citizens of these and other countries live and trade together without getting into insoluble legal conflicts, despite the absence of a common governmental ruler. The Argentinian who believes he has been aggressed upon by a Ceylonese, for example, takes his grievance to an Argentinian court, and its decision is recognized by the Ceylonese courts—and vice versa if the Ceylonese is the aggrieved party. Although it is true that the separate nation-States have warred interminably against each other, the private citizens of the various countries, despite widely differing legal systems, have managed to live together in harmony without having a single government over them. If the citizens of northern Montana and of Saskatchewan across the border can live and trade together in harmony without a common government, so can the citizens of northern and of southern Montana. In short, the present-day boundaries of nations are purely historical and arbitrary, and there is no more need for a monopoly government over the citizens of one country than there is for one between the citizens of two different nations.

    It is all the more curious, incidentally, that while laissez-faireists should by the logic of their position, be ardent believers in a single, unified world government, so that no one will live in a state of “anarchy” in relation to anyone else, they almost never are. And once one concedes that a single world government is not necessary, then where does one logically stop at the permissibility of separate states? If Canada and the United States can be separate nations without being denounced as being in a state of impermissible “anarchy,” why may not the South secede from the United States? New York State from the Union? New York City from the state? Why may not Manhattan secede? Each neighborhood? Each block? Each house? Each person? But, of course, if each person may secede from government, we have virtually arrived at the purely free society, where defense is supplied along with all other services by the free market and where the invasive State has ceased to exist.

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  14. Anonymous #1 here again,

    Michael,
    regarding your new scenario, you need to read chapters 12 and 13 of "Ethics of Liberty", Murray Rothbard.

    And your fallacy:
    "the possibility of disagreements creates the need for an institution to assure society's members that force employed is retaliatory"
    is specifically dealt with in chapter 1 of "Power and Market", Murray Rothbard.

    read more, write less.

    Taylor,
    Due to the good points you made I hunted down your blog. Well done so far, I have some new reading material.

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  15. Again, I have to anticipate a further objection (one day I'll consolidate these rebuttals).

    "What if a disagreement exists within your sacred, monopolizing limited government. Now what do you do smart-ass?"

    I don't deny the possibility of disagreements, including those within a limited government. Of course, its the duty of a limited government to act uniformly and avoid internal disputes. In cases of allegations of aggression, there's one truth. If Adam alleges that Jones aggressed against him, then a limited government needs to undergo an investigation. As Don Watkins writes,

    "To determine that an instance of force is retaliatory, men must know what the act of force was, the general standard by which guilt is to be determined, and what evidence was used to meet that standard in a particular case. Every member of society must have access to this information. And, of course, each of these elements must be objective (the laws, standards of evidence, and the evaluation of whether the evidence in question meets that standard)."

    A limited government aiming to protect the individual rights of its citizens will reach an objective conclusion and act accordingly. Furthermore, there are technological methods for coping with potential disagreement (appealing processes, checks and balances, separation of powers, etc.).

    "Well Michael, how well have those checks and balances worked in reality."

    Please. The potential for statism existed within the federal government since the very beginning because the founding of the nation, while truly revolutionary, was flawed in a number of very uncapitalistic ways.

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  16. Anon #1

    In reverse order:

    I reject Rothbard's claim that "minarchists" must champion a world government in order to remain consistent with their premises. I reject anarchism ,i.e., the absence of an agency that monopolizes the use of force over a given geographical area. Does anarchy exist over the area we label as Argentina and Uruguay? In a particularly shallow respect (with regard to our debate), yes, since an agency that monopolizes the use of force over Argentina and Uruguay does not exist. However, such monopolizers exist within Argentina and Uruguay and (very importantly) their jurisdictions do not overlap.

    When I point to a location, the question must be asked: "Is there *an* agency that monopolizes the use of force there? When I point to both Argentina and Uruguay, the answers for both are "yes." If the answer to such a question is "yes," then there is ultimately no anarchy and, thus, that undesirable (from my point of view) social condition is non-existent. I don't need to lobby for additional non-anarchism when such non-anarchism already exists.

    Regarding Rothbard's argument about different legal systems, I don't see how this contributes much to his case against the "laissez-farists," unless he's trying to draw some parallel between current separate legal systems and the viability of separate, private judicial/law enforcement agencies, in which case I would still reject his argument. That Argentina and Uruguay and (then) Ceylon could get along suggests that a world government, in this respect, is unnecessary. But the jurisdictions of the governments of these nations don't overlap, unlike under libertarian anarchism where all possess the right to wield force within the same geographic area without passing the conditional use test as described in my essay. The epistemological problem arises from the ability to use force without passing the conditional use test.

    "It is tedious and boring to refute your arguments when they've already been handled in detail."

    Well, then what in the hell are you still doing here?

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  17. Warning - For potential commenters:

    If you're going to comment, please don't offer schlocky, douchebag comments (exhibit A - Anon #1). I will curse you out.

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  18. "But the jurisdictions of the governments of these nations don't overlap, unlike under libertarian anarchism where all possess the right to wield force within the same geographic area"

    Wrong, they don't overlap in libertarian anarchy either. Each individual has a monopoly on the use of force on his own property.

    So it's great that you're not a believer in one world government. Now answer the second part of Rothbard's argument:
    "And once one concedes that a single world government is not necessary, then where does one logically stop at the permissibility of separate states?"

    In other words how small can your limited government be and why?

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  19. Fine - use force on your own property. And if he who has aggressed against you flees to his property or to the property of a friendly associate or maybe to the property of an indifferent or oblivious owner, I gather you won't simply let that fly. Perhaps you'll even exercise your libertarian anarchist right to use force without proving to the public first that your use of force will be retaliatory and employed to protect someone's individual rights. Alas, the epistemological problem arises. How do *we* (those within the area) know its retaliatory force?

    The size of government is but a technical issue, akin to me asking you how insurance companies would conduct themselves within an anarchist environment. History suggests the smaller the better, so decentralized governments are preferred. But don't interpret my appeal to technicality as an evasion. I don't know how many gigawatts are necessary to power a city, but I do know they are required to begin with.

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  20. "if he who has aggressed against you flees to his property or to the property of a friendly associate or maybe to the property of an indifferent or oblivious owner"

    This issue already arises today if someone commits a crime in one country and flees to another. So this can not be an objection against anarchy. Generally someone who commits a crime that is malum in se will not be able to get away with it no matter where they go and there is no reason to believe this wouldn't be the case under anarchy as well.

    When I asked how small your limited government can be, what I meant was: How small in terms of population can the state governed by your limited government be and why? If you've rejected the idea that everyone must live under one government that brings you close to the anarchist position. I'm trying to figure out how your limited government differs from anarchy. Do people have a right to secede from your limited government?

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  21. Taylor

    My name is from Samoan language. It translates to John. Samoan speakers say it with one syllable. English speakers say it with three.

    BTW I think your summation is correct. There remain many shortcomings in the minarchist position such that it remains unproven (in terms of being fit for Man).

    Regards

    Sione

    Sione

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  22. Michael,

    I agree with Anon that so far every "epistemological problem with anarchy" you've found, also applies to a world with government.

    What seems to be confusing the analysis at the moment is 1.) you are articulating a form of government that does not rely on taxes to finance itself, meaning you're just describing a form of potential social organization or "social technology" that could be incorporated voluntarily under anarchy but you then insist it's special to "government" and can't be part of a voluntary social order and 2.) You don't seem to see that the "size of government" is not a minor semantic quibble but is in fact an attempt to test the ultimate consistency of your position and 3.) You seem hooked on this idea of "duty" and all that entails... that only "government" can have a duty and that by assigning a duty to it it somehow means it accomplishes it's duty by virtue of it being assigned to it, which you then use to criticize an anarchic order with by saying there is no one with this duty so the duty won't be done.

    I have to side with Anon and the other commenters at this point because I don't think you've demonstrated anything. You keep saying you anticipate our objections yet your counter-objections have also been anticipated by the likes of Rothbard and others.

    Going forward, I'd suggest maybe that you try to focus on simple ideas and work on one point at a time rather than getting confused in a "grand thesis" response each time. I'd also stay away from formalistic logic or references to other philosophers and ideas that you do not specifically outline or summarize for us (for example, I thought the Roy Childs reference was irresponsible because I wasn't familiar with it and I don't think I should have to go read a guy's body of work to participate in this discussion).

    Finally, I'd watch the hostility in your tone because you could end up being proven wrong here. I know people have been rude dicks to you so far and that's fair for you to be belligerent back, but you don't want to get so wrapped in this egoistically that you're not able to admit you might have a flaw in your thinking later on because you worked so hard to condescend everyone.

    I mean, personally, I don't think you're making much sense so far. Your arguments are all self-contradictory it seems.

    Going to step back into the shadows again for a little while and watch you all duke it out some more.

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  23. Michael,

    Yes, in an anarchocapitalist setting, some people might use force and it would sometimes be hard to know if that force was initiatory or retaliatory. The same is true in the world I find myself in today. People will use force. Sometimes they will do so unjustly.

    How does it help anything to refer to those people who initiate force as a government? Presumably, I might define aggression out of existence by insisting that every initiator of force is actually a government. Viola, a world without aggression.

    But this does nothing to actually dimish the impact that aggression actually has on people. Whether or not the people who take your things and control your life call themselves a government, you are made worse off by their actions.

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  24. Looks like this topic has run its course! Pity, as it was getting interesting. Anyway, I was just thinking that there is another peroblem with the author's formulation.

    Conisder:

    "A potential is not an actual" - Rand

    Now apply that to the author's formualtion:

    "A logical conclusion from the above event is that Adam is a threat (a potential violator of moral rights) and as such is a hazard not only to Smith but to his local community."

    This argument goes on to rely on a "potential" to establish government. Since Adam is a potential threat government must be introduced into the affairs of Man. Interestingly it is impossible for Adam (or any other individual) to prove that he is not a potential threat. That would require proving the negative. The introduction of government does nothing to relieve the problem since the government itself (and each of its members) is a potential threat to every individual.

    The epistemological problems remain with those who institute government. The minarchist complaints against some forms of anarchism fail here.

    ---

    I note the use of Objectivist formulations in the original essay. That's fine as far as it goes but one has to consider that the Objectivist philosophy is incomplete and in some areas erroneous. Best to open up the range of one's enquiry somewhat beyond Objectivism alone.

    Sione

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